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Shadowing Lenders and Consumers: The Rise, 
Regulation, and Risks of Non-Banks
By Shelby D. Green
I. The Rise of the Non-Bank
Since the financial crisis of 2008, “shadow banking”1 
or financial transactions by “non-banks,” has skyrock-
eted. Non-banks are not depositary institutions and as 
such, they roam free, largely outside the purview of the 
bank regulators. They occupy all parts of the credit mar-
kets, from mortgage loan origination to payday lenders.2 
Untethered, they operate without government guaran-
tees, such as deposit insurance and have no access to 
emergency government lending facilities, such as the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window.
There are both positives and negatives in the rise of 
non-banks. On the positive side is market liquidity and 
greater diversity of funding sources for consumer bor-
rowing, which is often claimed to be a more efficient 
allocation of risk to investors.3 Also, by using alternative 
risk metrics in loan origination, non-bank lenders are 
increasingly making financing available to a particular 
demographic—the financially marginal. On the nega-
tive side, the heavy reliance on government guarantees 
and purchase of its loans may pose worrying systemic 
risks.
A. The Presence of Non-Banks in Mortgage 
Markets
Since the financial crisis of 2008 abated, non-banks 
nearly tripled their mortgage market share, rising from 
14% in 2007 to more than 50% in 2016.4 They origi-
nate more than 50% of all mortgages and nearly 80% 
of loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA),5 which supports lower-income borrowers. 
Shadow banks almost never retain originations on 
their balance sheets,6 but are increasingly reliant on 
the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)(Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac), as well as the Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) to pur-
chase their mortgages.7
In the first quarter of 2018, bank and non-bank 
mortgage lenders originated 1.81 million loans for 
residential properties (1 to 4 units); a third of these 
mortgages were purchase mortgages, nearly one-
half were refinance mortgages and the balance, home 
equity loans.8 In that total, non-banks, Quicken Loans,9 
Loan Depot,10 United Wholesale Mortgage,11 Caliber 
Home Loans,12 Fairway Independent Mortgage,13 and 
Guaranteed Rate14 were first, fourth, fifth, seventh, 
eighth, and ninth of the top ten lenders, respectively. 
Banks, Wells Fargo,15 JP Morgan Chase, 16 Bank of 
America, 17 and U.S. Bank18 were second, third, sixth, 
and tenth, respectively.
Other lending dynamics are also changing. Down 
payments are getting smaller—an average of 11.4%, 
down from the traditional 20%.19 The median FICO20 
score of borrowers is getting lower.21
B. Impetus for the Rise
The rise in non-bank mortgage lending seems a 
consequence of both a retreat by banks and market 
movements by non-banks.22 Banks are abandoning the 
primary market because the new regime of banking 
regulations made mortgage origination too costly.23 
New regulations on balance-sheet holdings, along with 
risk retention and liquidity requirements, meant higher 
costs associated with originating and selling mortgages 
to private label securities.24 Capital requirements that 
are higher than what a firm would choose on its own, 
represent lost opportunities because they reduce the 
amount of funds otherwise available for lending or 
investment. Banks also determined that the best way to 
avoid liability from missteps in loan origination is to stay 
out of the business altogether.25 Surprisingly, this retreat 
was more prominent in the case of larger banks than 
smaller ones; smaller banks and non-banks stepping in 
to fill the void.26
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On the other side of this dynamic are the business 
models used by non-banks, particularly online technol-
ogy in loan origination that have lowered the logistical 
barriers to entry in markets where lenders once needed 
networks of physical branches to build their businesses. 
These new operating models have given rise to the term 
“fintech” to describe platforms that use digital tools that 
eliminate intermediate parties and operate automatically. 
Heightened integration, greater efficiencies, lower costs, 
and improved ease of use for customers have proven to 
be ingredients for exponential growth in market share.
II. The Regulation of Non-Banks
There are reasons to be concerned about the tsunami 
of non-banks in the mortgage loan origination market. 
They relate to the reasons for regulating banks in the 
first place and for strengthening those regulations after 
the 2008 financial crisis. Recently, the former Fed Vice 
Chairman, Stanley Fischer, in an assessment of the cri-
sis, identified the non-banking sector as an important 
source of vulnerability. 27 The crisis was monumental 
and animated by regulatory myopia, sharp practices, and 
naiveté by both borrowers and lenders. The regulators 
saw only growing financial and housing markets, but 
did not consider that these levels were unsustainable.28 
Lenders originated loans almost at a frenzied pace for 
immediate profits, not taking the long view of the mar-
ket’s path. Investment banks operated on only veneers 
of capital.29 Borrowers amassed gargantuan debt. Firms 
depended on tens of billions of dollars of borrowing that 
had to be renewed every night, secured by subprime 
mortgage securities. Major firms and investors blindly 
relied on the AAA credit rating given to virtually all 
securities they were asked to rate, under pressure from 
the financial firms that paid for the ratings. The rate of 
borrowers who defaulted on their mortgages within 
months after closing nearly doubled from the summer 
of 2006 to late 2007, which meant that they likely took 
out loans that they neither could, nor intended to repay. 
Mortgage brokers were paid “yield spread premiums” 
by creditors as rewards for putting borrowers into high-
er-cost loans; creditors passing off the risks to purchasers 
of securities based on these loans. Nearly one-quarter of 
all mortgages made in the first half of 2005 were inter-
est-only loans. During the same year, 68% of “option 
ARM” loans30 originated by the two biggest players in 
this story, Countrywide and Washington Mutual, had 
low- or no-documentation requirements.31 In 2007, 
mortgage loan originations reached over $2 trillion; in 
2008, it declined to less than $.4 trillion, only to peak 
at almost $2.2 trillion in 2012 before declining again.32
A. Banking Reform under Dodd-Frank
Although Congress acted to adopt prophylactic 
measures for the future, the country fell into a deep 
recession that did not abate until June 2009.33 In July 
2010, Congress enacted the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).34 The act 
had many aims, including to “create a sound economic 
foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in 
Wall Street …end bailouts … and to prevent another 
financial crisis.”35 To achieve these aims, the legislation 
required prudent practices by creditors by limits on 
market activities posing significant systemic risks and 
by capital requirements. It also prohibited unfair lend-
ing practices and required plain language disclosures by 
creditors that would enable borrowers to make wise 
selections among financial products and services that 
best meet their needs.
1. Consolidation and Prudence
Dodd-Frank established the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) to monitor systemic risk 
and consolidated bank regulators from five agencies to 
four, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC),36 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC),37 National Credit Union Association 
(NCUA),38 and the Federal Reserve Board.39 New reg-
ulations include enhanced safety and soundness limits,40 
liquidity and capital requirements,41 and consumer safe-
guards.42 Together and separately, regulators have effec-
tive control over the life of banks, through the power 
to withdraw deposit insurance, revoke a charter, or take 
over one that is at risk of failing.
B. Control of Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises by the Federal Housing  
Finance Agency
The crisis could not have caught on without the 
support from the GSEs. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were profit-seeking, shareholder-owned corporations 
that had the advantage of their government-sponsored 
status to amass an undiversified investment portfolio 
of home mortgages and derivatives of more than $1.5 
trillion.43 When the crisis was at its worst, more than 
20% of these mortgages were in default.44 To head off 
the GSEs’ collapse, Congress passed the Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”)45 to 
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consolidate and strengthen their regulation. HERA cre-
ated the Federal Housing and Finance Agency (FHFA) 
giving it enhanced safety and soundness powers over 
the GSEs, resembling those of the federal bank regu-
lators. FHFA’s powers are draconian—it can set capital 
standards, order the GSEs to cease any activity or divest 
any asset that poses a threat to financial soundness, even 
replace management and take over control of the firms 
if they became seriously undercapitalized. One of the 
FHFA’s first actions was to place both Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in “voluntary” conservatorship. The two 
GSEs continued to operate under an agreement with 
the Treasury, which had provided capital to the them, by 
means of preferred stock purchases, to ensure that each 
remained solvent.46
IV. The New Regulatory Regime for 
Non-Banks: CFPB
Although not subject to the capital requirements of 
Dodd-Frank, non-banks are yet subject to consumer 
protection and transparency laws promulgated by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The 
CFPB was directed to bring the consumer protection 
regulation of depository and non-depository financial 
institutions into closer alignment and to provide federal 
oversight of both non-bank companies and banks in the 
mortgage market.47 It does this by conferring upon the 
CFPB jurisdiction over “covered persons,”48 as opposed 
to the particular activities in which they engage.49 This 
means that if an entity is subject to the CFPB’s super-
visory authority, the entire entity must comply with all 
federal consumer financial laws, and the CFPB has the 
power to assess the entire enterprise’s compliance sys-
tems and procedures to control risks to consumers or 
to markets.
A. CFPB Regulations on Safety and Soundness
Dodd-Frank notably granted the CFPB the power 
to write new mortgage loan origination and servicing 
standards. All of these rules apply to depository institu-
tions and non-banks alike. In its initial series of rulemak-
ings, the CFPB aimed to ensure creditors and borrowers 
make intelligent loan decisions and that the borrower 
understands the risks of the undertaking.
Specifically, the regulations require lenders to deter-
mine the borrower’s ability to repay the loan (ATR).50 
This determination must be made only after the exam-
ination of objective evidence, such as bank statements, 
pay stubs, tax returns, credit reports, rental payment his-
tory, and utility payments, among other things.51 There 
would no longer be “no doc” and “low-doc” loans. 
The CFPB also introduced the concept of “Qualified 
Mortgage” that gives rise to a presumption that the 
ATR requirements are satisfied.52 With certain specific 
exceptions, for a loan to be a qualified mortgage it must 
satisfy certain product limitations and requirements.53 
These include having a term that does not exceed 30 
years; does not charge points and fees that exceed a spe-
cific threshold54; does not contain interest-only, negative 
amortization, or balloon-payment terms; and does not 
exceed a 43 percent maximum debt-to-income ratio.55 
Appraisals are required for higher priced loans,56 and 
the appraiser must inspect the interior of the property.57 
New rules also require homeownership counseling.58
IV. The Risks of Alternative Lending
Do the ATR and disclosure requirements portend 
higher quality and safer lending in the growing world 
of alternative banking? The same and different market 
dynamics may be pushing us toward the same and per-
haps more intense crisis than in 2008. In general, mort-
gage loans originated by non-banks are of a lower credit 
quality than those originated by banks.59 Non-banks are 
capturing (and aggressively pursuing)60 a larger percent-
age of financially vulnerable borrowers—those with less 
income and wealth, those that are less likely to have 
college degrees and those that are more likely to be 
from a minority group.61 Over half of the loans origi-
nated by some non-banks are to borrowers with FICO 
scores below 660—a benchmark often used to denote 
subprime.62 Given these characteristics, shadow bank 
loans are more likely to default than traditional bank 
loans.63 High-delinquency rates portend dislocations in 
the market.64
Just as before the crisis, but perhaps more so, non-
bank lenders rely on the support that the GSEs (as well 
as Ginnie Mae) provide to the conforming mortgage 
market through the purchase of these loans, despite 
FHFA constraints.65
The borrowers are the same as those who suffered 
most in the financial crisis. In 2017, the Federal Reserve 
reported that in 2016, among home-purchase mort-
gages, 69 percent of blacks and 60 percent of Hispanic 
whites took out a nonconventional loan, that is, loans 
with mortgage insurance or other guarantees, including 
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the FHA and the VA, whereas 35 percent of non-His-
panic whites and only 16 percent of Asians did so.66 
Nonconventional loans usually have a higher loan-to-
value ratio. Non-banks originated a higher share of 
their home-purchase loans to minority borrowers and 
in low- to moderate-income neighborhoods (LMI) 
while large banks originated a significantly lower share 
of home-purchase mortgages to LMI borrowers.67
What may be even more concerning is that the 
assessment of credit risk may be camouflaged by the 
non-banks’ use of alternative metrics, instead of FICO 
scores, in loan origination.68 Algorithms that evaluate 
nontraditional, alternative information sources (such as 
insurance claims, utility bills, social networks, and data 
from Amazon and eBay),69 may produce high “loan 
grades” for some borrowers who would be classified 
as subprime by traditional criteria.70 The CFPB regu-
lations do not require the use of FICO, only that lend-
ers make the ATR determination based upon objective 
evidence. Surprisingly, despite the ready market that the 
GSEs and Ginnie Mae provide, non-bank loans carry 
interest rates that appear to be on average about 3.7 
basis points higher than similar loans issued by tradi-
tional bank lenders.71
A. Remembrance of Things Past: Systemic 
Risks Looming
Just as before, an excessive proliferation of risky 
FHA-insured loans to financially vulnerable borrowers 
portends system-wide risk from higher rates of defaults 
that, in turn, could result in huge counterparty risk.72 
Low down payments and high debt-to-income ratios 
increase the likelihood of default. These circumstances 
make the non-bank mortgage sector a significant chan-
nel for systems liquidity risks.73 These risks could lead to 
important dislocations in mortgage markets, especially 
for minority and lower-income borrowers. Because the 
government is heavily invested in non-bank lending, it 
will be required to backstop the loans, and because of 
the limited resources, the government parties are less 
likely to recover anything.74
Even as banks retreat from direct lending, they still 
support the business through warehouse lending to non-
banks, through lines of credit as opposed to direct lend-
ing to mortgage borrowers.75 Reliance on warehouse 
lending is risky, given the presence of margin calls due 
to aging risk, market-to-market evaluations, roll over 
risks and covenant violations leading to cancellations of 
the lines.76 If a financial crisis were to occur today, non-
banks may not have the resources to survive.77
V. Necessary Reforms for Safety  
and Soundness
Did the regulations overcorrect? Did they portend 
a crisis of another sort? The immediate reaction to the 
crisis caused a dramatic repricing of risk through tighter 
lending terms that reduced the supply of credit to all but 
those who didn’t need it. The market stalled. Ensuring 
access to credit in underserved communities surely is 
an important social policy, but it also calls for scrutiny 
against the kind of overreaching that put so many hap-
less borrowers in severe financial trouble leading to the 
crisis.78 Non-banks must not be allowed to operate in 
the shadows, but must be held up against safety and 
soundness measures that are calibrated to the risk inher-
ent in lending on the edges. On the borrowing side of 
the transactions, the use of untested and unconventional 
criteria for assessing creditworthiness should be allowed 
only as a comparative measure. The ATR requirement 
should include an assessment of whether the borrower 
will have residual income, that is, income for food, cloth-
ing, transportation, medical expenses, and other day-to-
day living expenses after paying for the expenses related 
to the home.79 For vulnerable borrowers, those with just 
enough qualifying income, but little available for con-
tingencies, a new type of mortgage might be prescribed, 
one that automatically indexes payments (and not nec-
essarily interest rates) to local economic conditions, 
causing them to adjust as local economic conditions, 
and perhaps even personal circumstances (such as a job 
change or unexpected medical expense) change. On the 
lending side, non-banks should be required to “maintain 
buffers of liquid assets that are sized according to the 
risk that their liability will run off quickly in a stress 
situation.”80 Most importantly, the government should 
heed the lessons from the crisis and step back to assess 
the larger market and demographic changes to see if the 
trends are positive or threatening.
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